

## Lindsey A. Gilmard

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<b>Education</b>	Ph.D., Social Science, California Institute of Technology Dissertation: <i>Reputation and Management</i> Committee: Alexander Hirsch (Chair), Marina Agranov, Michael Giblisco, Rod Kiewiet, Jonathan Katz	2023 (Expected)
	M.S., Social Science, California Institute of Technology	2018
	M.A., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley	2015
	M.P.P. with honors, University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy	2014
	B.A. with honors, Economics, University of California, Berkeley	2012
<b>Publications</b>	Gilmard, Lindsey. 2022. "Electoral Accountability and Political Competence." <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> 34 (2): 236-261.	
<b>Working Papers</b>	<b>"The Politics of Presidential Removals"</b> <i>Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization</i> <i>Abstract:</i> Presidents have increasingly used political appointments to control bureaucratic policymaking, yet politicizing appointments introduces distinct agency issues with political appointees that have not been explored. These agency issues arise precisely because political appointees may be removed by the president. I argue that the possibility of removal affects how appointees use bureaucratic expertise, which, in turn, affects presidential appointments. I develop a model in which the president is uncertain of an appointee's expertise, and infers it from the allocation of decision-making authority between an appointee and bureaucrat. I demonstrate that the threat of removal leads appointees to avoid delegations of authority to better-informed bureaucrats to appear more expert. In equilibrium, less expert appointees more aligned with the president face greater incentives to determine policy themselves to avoid damaging their reputation. By selecting non-ally appointees the president commits to sometimes dismiss even experts which improves her control over policymaking.	
	<b>"Reputation and Capture: Strategic Limits of the Administrative Presidency"</b> <i>Abstract:</i> Presidents rely on their political appointees to negotiate interactions with the bureaucracy on their behalf. Appointees often know more about their organizations than the president and, therefore, may be better positioned to generate bureaucratic support for the president's agenda. Yet, bureaucratic cooperation may be easier for appointees to sustain the more policy reflects the views of careerists tasked with implementation. I consider a model in which an appointee dictates a policy that a bureaucrat exerts effort to implement. The president is uncertain of both her appointee's management skill and the difficulty of the management problem her appointee faces. Instead, the president must infer the appointee's skill by observing his policy choice and whether implementation was successful. In equilibrium, both talented and weak appointees may give additional policy concessions to bureaucrats to ensure bureaucratic cooperation and improve their reputation with the president. This incentive exists even when the appointee shares the president's policy preferences.	
<b>Work in Progress</b>	"An Experimental Study of Delegation" with Marina Agranov and Alexander Hirsch.	

## Teaching

### California Institute of Technology

#### *Teaching Assistant*

- Analyzing Congress (Instructor: Alexander Hirsch)
- Introduction to Political Science (Instructor: Peter Ordeshook; Rod Kiewiet)
- A History of Budgetary Politics in the United States (Instructor: Rod Kiewiet)
- Regulation and Politics (Instructor: Rod Kiewiet)
- Economic Progress (Instructor: Philip Hoffman)

### University of Chicago

#### *Teaching Assistant*

- Introduction to Public Policy (Instructor: Chris Berry)
- Statistics (Instructor: Bruce Meyer)
- Math Camp for M.P.P. Students

<b>Awards &amp; Grants</b>	Linde Institute Experimental Grant (Caltech)	2023
	Linde Institute Experimental Grant (Caltech)	2022
	Formal Theory Fellowship (UC Berkeley)	2015

<b>Conference Presentations</b>	American Political Science Association annual meeting	2022
	Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting	2021
	Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting	2018
	American Political Science Association annual meeting	2018
	Southern Political Science Association annual meeting	2016

## References

### **Alexander Hirsch** (e-mail: [avhirsch@caltech.edu](mailto:avhirsch@caltech.edu))

- Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology

### **Marina Agranov** (e-mail: [magranov@hss.caltech.edu](mailto:magranov@hss.caltech.edu))

- Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology

### **Jonathan Katz** (e-mail: [jkatz@caltech.edu](mailto:jkatz@caltech.edu))

- Professor of Social Sciences and Statistics, California Institute of Technology

### **Michael Gibilisco** (e-mail: [michael.gibilisco@caltech.edu](mailto:michael.gibilisco@caltech.edu))

- Assistant Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology

### **Rod Kiewiet** (e-mail: [drk@caltech.edu](mailto:drk@caltech.edu))

- Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology